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This study develops two new measures of financial fragility: BRISK, which represents baseline risk, and 
PRISK, which measures systemic risk. BRISK and PRISK scores can be predicted one month ahead for both 
individual firms and for the overall financial system. These scores can be used to identify the most 
appropriate and effective policy response, thereby allowing regulatory authorities to intervene in a timely 
fashion. 
At present, prudential regulators commonly use stress testing to measure the financial fragility of banks 
and insurance companies. Each stress test focuses on an adverse scenario, assessing the impact of each 
adverse scenario on each financial institution. Adverse scenarios may specify changes in market values or 
macro-economic variables which may occur during the projected time-frame, including interest rate or 
credit spread movements, inflation rates, unemployment rates, changes in house prices, or changes in 
economic growth rates.  
Stress testing relies upon the choice of scenarios: it does not allow for the possibility of other scenarios. 
Stress testing does not measure the likelihood that any particular scenario will actually eventuate. Nor does 
it provide a coherent framework for combining different scenarios. 
The scenarios which are assessed in stress testing may be considered to be simulations from a stochastic 
model of economic variables. In this study, we assume that the market index is the key underlying factor 
which drives the scenarios. Market returns capture a common driver of bank returns and shortfalls. A 
model based on market returns permits an assessment of the risk posed to individual banks by an event 
such as a major market correction. By aggregating the outcomes for individual banks, it is possible to 
measure systemic fragility. 
In this model, daily bank and market price performance is the input for a stochastic model which predicts 
expected future capital shortfalls over a time-frame of one month. 
The model separates risk into two components: BRISK (baseline risk) and PRISK (systemic risk). Regulatory 
decision-making requires an understanding of both types of risk, both within individual firms and across the 
financial system. 
Baseline risk (BRISK) is related to volatility. High levels of BRISK at the individual firm level are potentially 
likely to make a correspondingly higher contribution to the overall level of stress. Firm-level BRISK tends to 
increase in line with the amount of debt that the firm is carrying. A high BRISK value shows the vulnerability 
of the firm to a capital shortfall and flags to regulators, such as APRA, the necessity for remedial action such 
as reducing debt or increasing capital. At the aggregate level, BRISK is a forward-looking indicator of the 
exposure of the individual firms and the system as a whole to failure.  
 
 
 
 
Systemic risk (PRISK) measures the impact of a system-wide shock. While such shocks are largely 
unpredictable, the differential impact on firms can be assessed. At the firm level, systemic risk is a function 
of the prevailing level of macroeconomic stress and the anticipated capital shortfall of the firm.  
By separating BRISK and PRISK factors, nuanced and more focused remedial or regulatory action can be 
taken either in relation to individual firms or the overall market. For an individual firm with a high level of 
BRISK or PRISK, remedies such as reduced leverage or a capital injection can be applied. However, when 
systemic risk is elevated for all firms, macro-economic measures, such as increased regulation, are likely to 
be required.  
The specific drivers of systemic risk are:  
 Financial dependence between firms;  
 Dependence of individual firms on common macroeconomic factors and market conditions;  
 Proportionally large balance sheets of key individual firms; and  
 High leverage, with debt levels many times the value of net assets.  
A firm’s PRISK reading is not an indication of an imminent capital shortfall, although the contribution of the 
firm to total overall PRISK enables regulators to identify systemically important firms. Also, a growing level 
of interdependency between firms increases their individual vulnerability to shocks that impact the overall 
system.  
A firm will typically have an elevated PRISK reading if it has a correspondingly greater anticipated capital 
shortfall during periods when the system is in distress. For example, a bank may record an elevated PRISK 
reading if it has a loan book with high loan-to-valuation ratios during a period when the labour market 
weakens or residential property prices fall.  
A firm may record a low PRISK reading even if its BRISK reading is high. For example, a firm that sources its 
business largely from the overseas markets will be correspondingly less impacted by stresses confined to 
the local system.  
This paper proposes a centralised model and assessment tool for the calculation and monitoring of baseline 
and systemic risks across firms. The model uses publicly available stock price returns, and makes simplified 
assumptions regarding capital requirements and debt, and market returns as a driver of firm stock returns.  
The model may be refined by identifying and incorporating key factors, apart from market returns, and 
their balance sheet impact. Such factors may include: interest rates; employment; economic growth and 
property prices. The impact of each factor will differ according to the specific characteristics of the 
particular firm’s balance sheet. For example, a bank whose asset base is largely comprised of residential 
loans will be correspondingly more sensitive to residential property price fluctuations than another that is 
more exposed to commercial loans. Detailed analysis of individual balance sheet exposures, and the factors 
that influence them, underpins potential refinements to the modelling of baseline and systemic risk 
calculations.  
